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THE LIBERALISATION OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES IN MEXICO AND ITS




NTERNATIONAL trade is a tool for encouraging economic growth
between nations. Its influence has been increasing, and as a result
the world has reached a higher level of interdependence. In general,
the prosperity of many nations has increased significantly in the last de-
cades.1 Thus, there is more competition, more availability of places to
invest, buy, or sell, and consequently, consumers have more choices.
Trade is allowing countries to focus on what they do best, which yields
more products or better services. 2
Mexico is a natural hub for trade and investment. It sits in a strategic
geographical position because it shares 2000 miles of border with the larg-
est market in the world. It is located at the center of the American conti-
nent, having coasts on the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans. Mexico has
become, particularly in the last ten years, the natural commercial bridge
between North and South America, between America and Europe, and
between Asia and America. Mexico took advantage of its location and
today "enjoys preferential access to 850 million consumers in thirty-two
countries," primarily because of Mexico's participation in a network of
*Research Fellow of the London Forum for International Economic Law and De-
velopment, Post-graduate student, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen
Mary College, University of London (g.vazquez@qmul.ac.uk).
1. John Jackson, Address at the Conference of the Law of International Trade and
Economics Relations of the A.B.A.'s Section of International Law and Practice
(October 29, 2003) (Jackson comments that "one big problem of the trading sys-
tem is that it does not address fair distribution[;] smaller countries are at a disad-
vantage in many ways before the big economies"). It is interesting to note that
50% of the world's trade is located in countries that have 10% of the world popu-
lation, 30% in countries that have 50% of the world population, and 1% in coun-
tries that have 40% of the world population. See also WORLD BANK,. GLOBAL
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2005: TRADE, REGIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT 8 (2005).
World trade growth averaged 10.2% in 2004, reflecting an increase in industrial
production and investment activity.
2. JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS RELATIONS 15 (2d ed. 2002).
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free trade agreements. 3
Among this network of trade agreements, the most important to Mex-
ico are the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which just
had its ten-year anniversary on January 1, 2004, and the Mexico-Euro-
pean Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA), which came into force on July 1,
2002. As a result of these agreements, Mexico has achieved important
relative preferences with respect to its competitors in foreign markets. In
addition, with respect to multilateral trade in services, and specifically fi-
nancial services, Mexico is bound to the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).
In theory, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) like NAFTA and
MEF-FA must go beyond the World Trade Organization (WTO), as re-
quired by article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and article V of the GATS. 4 However, this does not always hap-
pen, as Stephenson pointed out:
[I]t is clear that the multilateral discipline require that all RTAs en-
compassing services be more ambitious in their objectives and go
well beyond the GATS in terms of liberalization. The difficulty
arises in interpreting what is involved in 'going beyond' in a precise
manner, as there is a lack of clarity with respect to the kind of barri-
ers that an RTA should be expected to eliminate.5
In addition, the WTO Secretariat has acknowledged that "it is difficult
to establish to what degree a large number of RTAs achieve a deeper
level of integration than the WTO. ''6
In a recent study, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) observed that, first, "regional trade agreements can
complement, but cannot substitute for, coherent multilateral, rules and
progressive multilateral liberalisation," and second, "in some particularly
3. Luis de la Calle Pardo, The Importance of Foreign Direct Investment in the Eco-
nomic Development of Mexico, in OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT: NEW HORIZONS AND POLICY CHALLENGES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (November 2001), at http://www.oecd.org.
4. This situation brought up the question of implementing GATS article V, which
allows members to enter into regional agreements to liberalize trade in services as
long as they get a "GATS-plus" (do not raise the overall level of trade barriers to
WTO members who are not party to them and cover substantially all trade
sectors).
5. Sherry M. Stephenson, Regional Versus Multilateral Liberalization of Services, 1
WORLD TRADE REV. 204 (2002).
6. A recent OECD study (2002) assessed:
[T]o what extent provisions included in RTAs going beyond to WTO com-
mitments. The study focused on tariffs .. , services, labour mobility, trade
facilitation.., in APEC, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and the EU. The conclusion
was that in many respects RTAs have not progressed too much beyond the
GATT/WTO Agreements and that it was very difficult to determine whether
RTAs represented an improvement in terms of liberalization of trade. (em-
phasis added).
WTO SECRETARIAT, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2003 54, available at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/news-e/pres03-e/pr348_e.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2004) [hereinafter WTO REPORT
2003].
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sensitive areas, regional initiatives have been no more successful-and in
some cases less successful-than activity at the multilateral level."'7 In the
specific case of financial services, the OECD stated that "while the GATS
has achieved a higher level of bound liberalisation in financial services
than that found in most RTAs, the development of the GATS Under-
standing on Commitments in Financial Services took advantage of in-
sights gained in financial market opening at the regional level." 8 That
being said, it is of considerable relevance to know, from a legal perspec-
tive, whether each RTA has gone beyond the WTO agreements.
In this regard, this article discusses how the liberalization of financial
services has occurred in Mexico since NAFTA came into force in 1994;
what its implications and connections with NAFTA, MEFTA, and GATS
have been; and to what extent NAFTA and MEFTA have achieved posi-
tive results beyond the GATS in such liberalization. Earlier research by
Stephenson 9 took notice of what has been achieved in NAFTA in com-
parison to GATS (2002). First, this paper updates recent effects; second,
it examines the previous analyses; and third, it examines such liberaliza-
tion in the context of the new MEFTA and legislative reforms that in-
creased foreign participation in Mexico's financial system.
It can be argued that the liberalization of financial services in Mexico
has been strikingly fast. In just the past ten years, from 1994 to 2004,
foreign participation in the Mexican banking system has risen remarkably
from 5 to 80 percent as measured by the share in total assets of foreign
banks. Regulation on entry into the financial market of financial services
has experienced changes, significantly diminishing entry barriers. This
liberalization has been achieved mainly through three steps.
The first step was by way of NAFTA, where the liberalization process
in financial services began. For example, NAFTA stated that no foreign
bank can have more than 1.5 percent market share, and it will gradually
increase the aggregate foreign market share limit in banking from 8 to 15
percent. The aggregate foreign investment is limited to 30 percent.
The second step was the Mexican Congress's approval of legislative re-
forms in the financial sector, which were published in the Official Diary
on February 15, 1995. The market share limit in individual holdings was
increased from 1.5 to 6 percent, and the aggregate foreign market share
limit was increased from 8 to 25 percent. The aggregate foreign invest-
ment is limited to 49 percent. The transitional implementation projected
once in NAFTA, step-by-step during a period of six years for financial
services until 2000, was changed when the Mexican peso crashed, and the
financial system collapsed at the end of 1994. Even though Mexico was
entitled (by way of paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 of section B and para-
graph 1 of section C of the Schedule of Mexico, Annex VII of NAiFTA)
7. OECD, REGIONALISM AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 20 (OECD,
Doc. No. 222003031E1, 2003).
8. Id. at 11.
9. Stephenson, supra note 5, at 193.
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to establish market share limits on U.S. and Canadian banks in the event
of any financial crisis, the contrary happened because the Mexican Con-
gress eliminated more barriers to foreign investment.
In 1999, the third step occurred when Congress approved a measure
allowing foreign economic agents to own 100 percent of the capital stock
of Mexican banks. 10 This was due to the view that foreign banks could
play a positive role in the capitalization and rescuing of troubled national
banks. Since then, foreign institutions have been merging with and buy-
ing domestic banks. Most notable are the entrance of the American and
European conglomerates such as Citibank, HSBC, Scotiabank, and
Banco Bilbao Viscaya. These banks have injected significant capital into
the financial system.
This paper is divided into six sections. After this introduction, section
II begins with a brief overview of the current Mexican trade economy and
its network of free trade agreements. Section III will briefly look into the
recent history of the Mexican economy and its financial system. Section
IV will focus on the background of NAFTA and its general impact on
Mexico, looking at the positive and negative effects. In addition, it will
examine the implications of the new commercial relationship between
Mexico and the European Union. Section V will compare some of the
common objectives of the liberalization of trade in services and specifi-
cally in financial services among NAFTA and GATS. It will examine how
and to what extent NAFTA and MEFTA have gone beyond GATS. Fi-
nally, section VI summarizes key points and provides some conclusory
observations.
II. MEXICO AS THE NATURAL HUB IN THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEM
Mexico is situated in a unique and strategic geographical location. It
has become the commercial bridge between North, Central, and South
America in addition to serving as a link between America and Europe
and America and Asia. Furthermore, Mexico shares 2000 miles of border
with the largest market in the world and is the third largest recipient of
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the world (behind China and Brazil).
Mexico is the eighth largest trading power in the world and is the larg-
est trading power in Latin America, with 43 percent of the region's ex-
ports and 38 percent of total imports.11 It has emerged as the second
largest export market for U.S. goods and has displaced Japan as the sec-
ond largest trading partner. Mexican exports to the United States have
grown twice as fast as exports from the rest of the world, and it has "in-
creased its share in total U.S. imports from 6.8 percent in 1993 to 11.4
10. Published on Jan. 19, 1999, in the Mexican Official Diary, available at http://
dof.terra.com.mx/.
11. BANCOMEXT, THE MEXICAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE, INDUSTRIAL COSTS IN
MEXICO 2001: A GUIDE FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS (6th ed. 2001) [hereinafter
BANCOMEXT STUDY].
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percent in September 2001." 112 A recent OECD study shows that in the
last twenty years:
Mexico moved away from specializing in primary goods towards a
greater specialization in manufacturing products such as motor vehi-
cles, consumer electronics and computer equipment. This is in
marked contrast to Argentina, Brazil and Chile which continue to
specialize in primary products... Mexico's pattern of specialization,
which follows a similar path to that of the US and the EU and which
is highly dependant on access to FDI or other forms of partnership,
may be the result of Mexico's participation in the NAFTA and its
increased market integration within North America.' 3
Paiva Abreu comments that "Mexico is by far the most important trad-
ing economy in Latin America: its total trade in 1999 was 45% of total
Latin American trade, representing almost three times total trade from
the second important trading nation: Brazil, and 80% more than total
Mercosur trade."' 4 With these numbers (the total trade for Mexico in
1999 was U.S. $278 billion, whereas Brazil accounted for U.S. $98 billion),
it is possible to see the important role Mexico is playing in the context of
international and regional trade.' 5
Mexico is currently pursuing its economic model of development based
on free trade agreements, privatization, and openness to foreign invest-
ment.' 6 In addition to NAF-TA, MEFTA, and the Free Trade Agreement
with the European Association of Free Commerce, Mexico has concluded
several trade agreements with the following countries: Bolivia, Vene-
zuela, Colombia, the North Triangle (composed of Guatemala, Honduras,
and El Salvador), Chile,17 Israel,' 8 Costa Rica, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador,
12. De la Calle Pardo, supra note 3, at 2.
13. WTO REPORT 2003, supra note 6, at 63.
14. Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Latin America and Caribbean Interest in the WTO, in
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 21 (Diana Tussie ed., 2003).
Mercosur's total trade was about 45% of total trade in all other Latin American
and Caribbean economies, Mexico excluded. Mercosur's 1999 GNP represented
48.7% of total GNP of the region (of which Brazil accounts for 33.9%, Mexico
24%, the Andean Community as a whole 16.7%, and Chile 4%).
15. BANCOMEXT STUDY, supra note 11, at 22.
16. Id. at 23. Between 1994 and 2000, Mexico received more than $74 billion of FDI,
placing itself among the leading countries recipients of FDI development (after
China and Brazil).
17. Id. at 31. From 1991 to 1999, the trade between Mexico and Chile grew 458% and
in 2000 it was around US $369 million. Thus, Mexico has become the most dy-
namic partner for Chile's products. The favourable commercial performance be-
tween Mexico and Chile brought about negotiation in order to extend and to
deepen the coverage of the Economic Complementation Agreement subscribed in
1991. Because it only considered the liberalization of trade in goods, the new
agreement included services, investment, controversy solution, governmental
purchases, and copyrights.
18. Id. at 33; the agreement negotiated with Israel is the first trade agreement that
Mexico has negotiated with a Middle East nation. For Mexican exporters, Israel
represents a potential market with annual imports that surpass US$30 billion. In
1999, the bilateral commerce between Mexico and Israel increased to US$169 mil-
lion. The current trade between Mexico and Israel is complementary. It will also
stimulate trade and investment among theses countries "because Israel and Mex-
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Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Panama, Dominican Republic, and
Nicaragua. 19 More recently, President Vicente Fox visited Japan's Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi during the first week of October 2003, in or-
der to sign the final points of a free trade agreement. 20 Mexico has par-
tial agreements with various countries in South America, including
Belize, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Uruguay. Mexico is also participating
in the constitution of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 21
Mexico broke its protectionist past and since the 1980s has sought to
attract foreign investment and to incorporate technology transfer. In ad-
dition, Mexico has achieved the removal of trade barriers; the gradual
reductions in tariffs; the elimination of performance requirements; the es-
tablishment of rules of expropriation, compensation, and dispute settle-
ment mechanism; and the remittance of capital abroad.
A good example of the new changes used to attract foreign investment
is the case of expropriation in NAFTA. Chapter 11 (the Investment
Chapter) abolishes the Calvo Doctrine. 22 Named after the Argentinean
international law expert Carlos Calvo, the doctrine states that foreigners
are limited to the same treatment given to nationals. Mexico has surren-
dered this historic legal principle in order to provide more legal certainty
and predictability to foreign investors. This is important because NAFTA
party banks and investors will be protected by the due process and fair
compensation from any act of expropriation, nationalization, or any act
of the state that could affect them in any form. 23 Mexico, like other Latin
American countries, has suffered military interventions several times
throughout its history as an independent country, making this legal prin-
ico are the only countries with preferential access to US, Canada and the EU, with
which both countries have already signed free trade agreements." Id.
19. Joseph J. Norton, Doing Business Under the FTAA Reflections of a U.S. Business
Lawyer, 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 431 (2000) (negotiations will continue on
course to sign free trade agreements with Singapore).
20. Pigs May Fly, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 56. The agreement is important
for both countries, but for different reasons. Mexico's trade deal has turned it into
one of the most open trading nations, as well as struggling to overcome their
problems in its economy due to the increasing high competition from China. One
way of doing this is by getting more access to the Japanese market. For Japan,
Mexico would be its second free trade agreement, after Singapore. The farm prod-
ucts are the main obstacles. Pork already accounts for 10% of Mexico's exports to
Japan. Japanese officials complain in turn at Mexico's reluctance to lower its tar-
iffs on steel.
21. WTO REPORT 2003, supra note 6, at 48. Forty-three percent of the world mer-
chandise trade "now occurs under the umbrella of preferential trade agreements,"
and "this share will increase as more RTAs are negotiated in the future." Id.
22. PAUL HASTINGS ET AL., NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: SUMMARY
AND ANALYSIS (1993); North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), opened
for signature Dec. 8, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1994), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org [hereinafter NAFTA].
23. KRISTA N. SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE
NAFrA PROVISIONS 257 (1999). The political and economic situation for Mexico
before NAFTA was uncertain and NAFrA brought credibility to the Mexican
market as a stable financial market.
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ciple justified. 24 Historically, Mexico and other Latin American govern-
ments tried to limit diplomatic interventions of other countries toward
nationals who were living or investing in these countries. The Mexican
government, for example, refused to hear private claims for compensa-
tion under any law but its own. The Calvo Doctrine led to much dissatis-
faction among foreign investors, as these investors had to accept the risk
of uncompensated nationalizations if they brought assets into Mexico.25
It is important to bear in mind that in the case of trade in financial ser-
vices, Mexico, like most other Latin American countries, are not net ex-
porters, but rather net importers of financial services; consequently, it is
understandable why, in the beginning of the trend of liberalization, these
countries were reluctant to liberalize trade in services. 26
III. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE
MEXICAN ECONOMY
From 1950 to 1970, Mexico had a stable economy with low inflation.
The increase in oil prices in 1973 brought several economic benefits to the
country as a result of significant growth in export revenues. However, as
Norton suggests, "Much of the exuberance was rooted in the country's
estimation of its national control of petroleum resources in light of rock-
eting oil prices in 1970's ... Mexico, as did most Third World countries,
held to an economic policy of import-substitution industrialisation and
severe restrictions on foreign direct investment. '27
This temporal situation incited a false feeling of welfare in the country.
Mexican state-owned companies and the Mexican government itself had
borrowed more from foreign banks than any other developing country in
the world. The external debt quadrupled between 1976 and 1982. In the
meantime, the government faced a large deficit and expanded programs,
such as investing huge amounts in health and education. 28
24. The French invasion in 1863 and the U.S. invasion in 1847 (when Mexico was
forced to sign the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty). In this treaty, Mexico lost more
than half of its territory: California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, with the last
invasion in 1914 by the U.S. Navy in the Port of Veracruz.
25. SCHEFER, supra note 23, at 210. It is noteworthy that the GATS/WTO rules on
services and financial services do not deal with the topic of expropriation, although
customary international law says that expropriation should be based on non-dis-
criminatory principles.
26. However, the countries that have unilaterally liberalized their financial sector, like
Mexico, have experienced gains in the efficiency in the sector. Inter-American
Development Bank, Financial Integration, in BEYOND BORDERS: THE NEW RE-
GIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 105 (2002), available at http://www.iadb.org/res/
publications/pubfiles/pubb-2002e_7384.pdf [hereinafter Financial Integration
IADB Doc].
27. JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
265 (2000).
28. THOMAS DALSGAARD, The Tax System in Mexico: A Need For Strengthening the
Revenue-Raising Capacity 8 (OECD, Working Paper No. ECO/WKP(2000)6,
2000) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/11/1884584.pdf (last visited
Sept. 12, 2004). With respect to fiscal policies, the Mexican Government was ex-
tremely dependant on oil revenues and the expenditures were high. After the cri-
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The overvalued currency policy was implemented. Speculation on the
peso's devaluation spurned further cycles of devaluation and massive
transfers of money outside the country. 29 When oil prices fell and the
world interest rate rose, however, the downward capital market revalua-
tion of Mexico was inevitable, thus putting the country into crisis. One
crisis arose in 1982 when the government declared a suspension of pay-
ments on the foreign debt, imposed exchange controls, and devalued the
peso. 30 These acts resulted in the cessation of inflows of foreign private
capital.31
The government passed a decree nationalizing the banking system
(with the exception of Citibank), but the measure functioned as more
than a nationalization. It was an expropriation because the owners were
already Mexican nationals. Many experienced bankers who did not ap-
prove of the measure left their positions, and those employees who
stayed often did not have the necessary training. In addition, high infla-
tion and high interest rates increased the costs of bank funds, which re-
sulted in many in the private sector pulling their capital resources out of
bank instruments and putting them into governments bonds.32
The process of modernization in Mexico started in the 1980s with Presi-
dent Miguel De La Madrid, who encouraged privatization. Norton
writes, "[T]he government permitted 34 per cent of non-voting shares to
be sold to private Mexican buyers . . .Mexico had embarked upon a
broad trade programme, including reduction of the use of import licences
[and] major tariff cuts."'33 The government announced that the country
was joining GATT, and subsequently it joined the Mexico-U.S. Commer-
cial Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment, signed on Novem-
ber 1987 (predecessor to NAFTA).34 During the late 1980s, Mexico
started to modify its commercial, civil, and property laws. The respect of
human rights began to be part of the daily agenda, and the path to de-
mocracy began to emerge.
During President Salinas de Gortari's presidency, the government laid
the foundation of today's Mexican economy. A strong commitment to
liberalization and privatization existed,35 and several reforms helped the
sis, the Government was looking to increase the tax base and engaged in the issue
of tax evasion.
29. SCHEFER, supra note 23, at 98.
30. Lee C. Buchheit, A Lawyers Perspective on the New International Financial Archi-
tecture, 14 J. INTL. BANKING L. 225 (1999), reprinted in THE REFORM OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (R. Lastra ed., Kluwer Law Int'l, 2001).
Virtually all lending to emerging market borrowers ceased. The existing credits to
these countries were subjected to repeat rescheduling throughout the 1980s.
31. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATIONS 1137 (6th ed. 1997).
32. NORTON, supra note 27, at 265.
33. Id. at 266.
34. Id.
35. REGULATORY REFORM IN MEXICO: ENHANCING MARKET OPENNESS THROUGH
REGULATORY REFORM 20 (OECD, 1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/44/57/2507154.pdf. In 1994, Mexico's accession to the OECD was instru-
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economy, including the liberalization of deposit and lending rates, the
elimination of the mandatory requirement for commercial banks to hold
long-term commercial paper to maturity, and the elimination of reserve
requirements. Norton has drawn attention to the fact that legislative
changes were very important, such as the Law for the Regulation of Fi-
nancial Groups, which allowed a single holding company to provide a
variety of financial services (i.e. banking, brokerage, and insurance ser-
vices). 36 Also, the eighteen state-owned banks became totally privatized.
Toward the end of 1994, Mexico faced another strong economic crisis,
its consequences later known as the Tequila Effect. Within the country,
many argued that the crisis was due to clearly incompetent management
of the Government, el error de diciembre (the December mistake).
Maysami writes:
[T]he exchange rate crisis that shook Mexico at the end of December
1994 was made possible, if not inevitable, by policy mistakes stretch-
ing back several years. Among the underlying weaknesses were an
overvalued real exchange rate, declining central bank reserves, and
an unstable structure of domestic and external debt.
37
In December 1994, the Foreign Exchange Commission (FEC) aban-
doned the exchange rate regime and tried to stabilize the foreign ex-
change market by raising the upper limit. The FEC later changed this
policy, however, to ensure the establishment of a freely floating exchange
rate system. 38 The Mexican government devalued the peso 15 percent
against the dollar, and two days later allowed the peso to float. It subse-
quently fell 50 percent in one month. In 1994, Mexico's government
spent U.S. $20 billion to protect the peso. Because reserves were reduced
to U.S. $6 billion, the real interest rates reached high levels, causing seri-
ous difficulties for financial intermediaries and for debtors in general. A
large number of investors withdrew their money, and consequently the
reserves in Mexico disappeared. 39 Once the crisis began, the Mexican
government tried to handle it quickly by implementing several programs,
such as minimizing the inflationary effects of the devaluation, encourag-
ing constitutional and legislative reforms, 40 promoting competitiveness in
the private sector, and establishing a coherent floating exchange rate
regime.
At this point, the second step in the liberalization of financial services
came into place in Mexico. Congress approved and published the legisla-
mental in the extension of NAFTA's investment commitments to non-NAFTA
countries.
36. NORTON, supra note 27, at 267.
37. R.C. Maysami & J.J. Williams, National Policy and Structural Reform: Pillars of
Stable Mexican Economic Growth, 7 J. INT'L BANKING L. 174, at 174-75 (2001).
38. THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND
CHILE 161 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997).
39. Id.
40. Maysami & Williams, supra note 37, at 2 (this reform also includes the amendment
to allow private investment in railroads and satellites).
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tive reforms in the Official Diary on February 15, 1995.41 Among the
reforms, it is noteworthy that, in the banking system, the individual hold-
ing market share limit was increased from 1.5 to 6 percent, and the aggre-
gate foreign market share limit was increased from 8 to 25 percent, and
the aggregate foreign investment was limited to 49 percent. Thus, the
initial implementation once projected by NAFTA (step-by-step during a
period of six years for financial services until 2000) was suspended when
the Mexican peso crashed and the financial system collapsed at the end of
1994. Even when Mexico was entitled (according to the paragraph 9, 10,
11, 13, and 14 of section B and paragraph 1 of section C of the Schedule
of Mexico, Annex VII of NAFTA) 42 to establish market share limits on
U.S. and Canadian banks in the event of financial crisis, the contrary hap-
pened as more barriers to foreign investment were eliminated by the
Mexican Congress. An important key issue is the soundness of a
macroeconomic policy framework "which promotes growth by keeping
inflation low, the budget deficit small, and the current account sustaina-
ble. '' 43 When Mexico promulgated the legislative reforms in 1995, how-
ever, it did not have any of these. In addition the financial system was in
serious need of capitalization, and the legislative reforms came to en-
courage foreign participation.
Mexico's crisis had several factors in common with the Asian crisis of
1997, among other common factors we can observe that a weak banking
system, excessive leverage, "inter-bank funding, especially in foreign cur-
rencies, moral hazard, weak central banks, underdeveloped securities
markets and inadequate legal structures, are mostly related to law-based
failures. ' 44 The banking system was too weak when Mexico joined
NAFTA. There were several reasons for this weakness, among which
were erroneous economic policies. When the banking system was priva-
tized, the banks were focused mainly on lending to the government and
state-owned companies in order to subsidize Mexico's scandalous deficit,
lack of proper management in the banks, lack of transparent procedures
when the privatization itself was carried out, and lack of moral solvency
and technical acumen of the people in charge of the banks.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), together with the U.S. gov-
ernment, has played an important role in helping the Mexican govern-
ment deal with the crisis. It is interesting to note that the IMF has
violated its internal rules by granting Mexico a loan equal to seven times
its quota, in addition to exhibiting unprecedented speed in its negotia-
tion.45 Mexico received considerable support because, at that moment, it
41. The following laws were modified: (1) Credit Institutions Law (Ley de Institu-
ciones de Credito); (2) Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores); and
(3) Financial Groups Law (Ley para Regular las Agrupaciones Financieras).
42. NAFTA, supra note 22, 32 I.L.M. at 289.
43. NORTON, supra note 27, at 11.
44. Id. at 11-12.
45. JEFFREY D. SACHS, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?, Frank D.
Graham Lecture, Princeton University 2 (Apr. 1995), http://www.earthinstitute.co-
lumbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf.
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was illiquid but solvent. As Sachs points out, "Not many countries share
a 2,000 mile border with the IMF's largest shareholder. '46
Guillermo Ortiz, ex-minister of Finance, said that the Mexican (1994-
1995) and Asian (1997) crises had similarities because, in both cases, they
caught many by surprise: investors suddenly changed their wills, there
was generally good progress in the economy, and the banking systems
expressed signs of problems before the crisis. 47
In 1994, political and criminal events had an adverse effect on market
expectations. These events included the kidnapping of an important
banker, the assassination of presidential candidate Donaldo Colosio, the
accusations and resignation of the Deputy Attorney General, and the
hostility of the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas.
To face the economic crisis, the government, along with Banco de Mex-
ico and labour sectors, agreed to sign the Unity Agreement to Overcome
the Economic Emergency (Acuerdo de Unidad para Superar la
Emergencia Economica). The government also took some other actions,
such as keeping inflation under control. 48 The Exchange Stabilization
Fund (Fondo de Estabilizacion Cambiaria) helped the economic pro-
gram. 49 Foreign financial authorities and international organizations,
such as the IMF, assisted with the creation of this fund to help the Mexi-
can economy.
In the financial sector, other programs were implemented, such as the
Immediate Support Agreement to Banking Sector Debtors (Acuerdo In-
mediato a los Deudores de la Banca, ADE), later known as the Savings
Protection Fund (FOBAPROA), whose successor is the Institute for the
Protection of Bank Savings (IPAB). 50 Thus, when the Mexican banks ex-
perienced trouble in 1995, they submitted to the control of FOBAPROA
and were subsequently sold, with most of them being acquired by foreign
banks (i.e. Citibank, HSBC, Banco Bilbao Vicaya, Scotiabank, and
others).
The fund allocated to rescuing Mexico contained more U.S. $52 billion.
The United States arranged a U.S. $9 billion credit line at the Federal
Reserve. The United States then exchanged U.S. $20 billion for pesos
with Mexico for three to five years. Mexico agreed to pay a fee for the
46. Id.
47. Guillermo Ortiz Martinez, What Lessons Does the Mexican Crisis Hold for Recov-
ery in Asia?, FIN. & DEV., June 1998, at 6 (1998).
48. Rescuing the Sombrero, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 1995, at 18.
49. News Brief, IMF, IMF Executive Board Set to Consider Stand-By Credit for Mex-
ico, (June 15, 1999), available at http:l/www.imf.org/external/np/seclnb/1999/
NB9929.htm.
50. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, COM-
MITTEE ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, MERGERS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
191 (OECD, Doc. No. DAFFE/CLP(2000), 2000), available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/34/22/1920060.pdf. In Mexico, the protection of bank deposits is al-
most complete but it will progressively be dismantled until 2005 when only depos-
its up to approximately US$110,000 will be protected.
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exchange and set aside oil revenues as security.51 The IMF lent Mexico
U.S. $17.8 billion,52 and some members of the Bank for International Set-
tlements lent U.S. $10 billion, with U.S. $3 billion lent by commercial
banks and U.S. $1.5 billion lent by the Bank of Canada.53
The Mexican economy is currently progressing. The government has
made repayments to the IMF, and inflation and interest rates are declin-
ing. Exports are increasing (in only ten years Mexican exports have
grown from U.S. $31 billion to U.S. $136 billion). 54 The external deficit is
small. There has been a strong increase in net international reserves since
1996. 55 Trade and current account balances have improved. The peso
has recovered. Foreign reserves have risen. And the stock market has
also recovered. 56 One of IMF's arguments discusses the remarkable pro-
gress that Mexico has accomplished in reestablishing macroeconomic
stability, the government unveiled a medium-term program-the Na-
tional Program to Finance Development (PRONAFIDE). 57
The third step in the liberalization of financial services in Mexico oc-
curred in 1999 when the Congress approved a measure that allowed for-
eign participants to own 100 percent of the Mexican banking system.58
According to the Initiative of the Executive and the debates in the Mexi-
can Congress, this reform resulted from the continuous urgency to attract
more capital and modern technologies, more competition, and efficiency
and productivity in the financial system, which was still without signifi-
cant strength.5 9
51. Quick or Quagmire?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 1995, at 95. The condition was the
change in policies on everything from immigration and labour laws to policy to-
wards Cuba.
52. The Funds Sums, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 1995, at 10; Press Release, IMF, IMF
Approves US$17.8 Billion Stand-By Credit for Mexico (Feb. 1, 1995).
53. Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 31, at 1201.
54. BANCOMEXT STUDY, supra note 11, at 15. The exports of Mexico have grown sig-
nificantly. In only four years, Mexican exports to the United States have grown
142%, to the European Union 40%, to Latin America 113%, and the Asian Tigers
(South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) 191%. Exports also represent
the most dynamic sector of the economy and the first creator of employment. In
the last few years, export growth has contributed half of the increase of gross do-
mestic product. Since 1994, exports have been increased to 124.8%. Mexico has
diversified its exports in all sectors. Regarding imports, in only five years, Mexico
increased its imports to 79%. In 1999, total imports to Mexico increased 13% in
relation to 1998 and 32% more than in 1997.
55. News Brief, IMF, Camdessus Welcomes Advance Repayment of Loans by Mexico,
Positive Developments in Mexican Economy, (Jan. 15, 1997), available at http:/
www.imf.org/externallnp/sec/nb/1997/nb9701.htm.
56. News Brief, IMF, IMF Board Releases US$2 Billion for Mexico: Sets Schedule for
Remaining US$8.7 Billion (June 30, 1995), available at http:/www.imf.org./exter-
nal/np/sec/nb/1995/nb9516.htm.
57. News Brief, IMF, IMF Staff Views Favorably Mexican Medium-Term Program(June 3, 1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/
NB9710.HTM.
58. Published Jan. 19, 1999, in the Official Diary, Ministry of Interior (Secretaria de
Gobernacion), available at http://dof.terra.com.mx.
59. Reasons for the Legislative Reform to the Credit Institutions Law presented by
the Executive, published Jan. 19, 1999, in the Official Diary, Ministry of Interior
(Secretaria de Gobernacion), available at http://dof.terra.com.mx.
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Since 1999, foreign institutions have been merging with and buying do-
mestic banks. Most notable are the entrances of the American and Euro-
pean conglomerates such as Citibank, Banco Bilbao Viscaya, and, more
recently, HSBC. These banks have injected significant capital into the
financial system. Because of these investments, Mexico has the deepest
foreign bank participation in Latin America, accounting for 50 percent in
2000, 74 percent in 2002, and more than 80 percent in 2004.60 The entry
of foreign banks has caused significant positive changes in the banking
sector, such as giving borrowers and investors access to new financing and
investment, increasing efficiency and productivity, increasing competi-
tion, and decreasing interest rates charged by banks. This is also the cur-
rent view of Mexico held by the IMF and the OECD. According to the
OECD Economy Survey of Mexico:
[T]he financial sector has experienced an increase in efficiency and
profitability, a system-wide re-capitalisation and an overall clean-up
of balance sheets ... Today, the Mexican banking system is increas-
ingly solid and as profitable as in the rest of the OECD counterparts;
and the supervision and regulatory frameworks are close to best
practices. 6 '
Similarly, the IMF's Financial System Stability Assessment on Mexico
concluded that "given the large participation of strong foreign banks, the
still low participation of banks in financial intermediation, and the recent
strengthening of capital, the banking system, should not become a source
of problems. ' '62 The OECD Survey also suggests, however,that there are
some points that still need improvement, such as facilitation in the collec-
tion of bad loans (bankruptcy procedures), and the low level of credit to
60. See Financial Integration IADB Doc., supra note 26, at 108; see also IMF, MEXICO:
FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT 13 (IMF Country Report No. 01/192,
2001); see also Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann, &Lorenza Martinez, NAFTA
and Mexico's Less-than Stellar Performance 8 (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Working paper 10289, Feb. 2004), available at http://www.nber.org; see also
The Difference a Name Makes, FIN. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at 14 ("Almost 90 per cent
of Mexican banking assets are now [2004] in foreign banks"); see also Romina
Roman Pineda, Mexico: A Mine of Gold for Foreign Banks, EL UNIVERSAL, May
3, 2004, at 1. Mexico has become one of the most profitable markets for the for-
eign banks (Citibank, HSBC, BBV and Scotiabank), with bank profits in Mexico
surpassing those obtained elsewhere in Latin America, Africa, and Japan. HSBC
just obtained profits 63% larger than the prior year. For this reason, Banco Bilbao
Viscaya Argentaria and Scotiabank have acquired 99% of the shares of the Mexi-
can banks Bancomer and Inverlat.
61. OECD, Economic Survey of Mexico 2002, in POLICY BRIEF 5 (March 2002),http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/18/2068882.pdf [hereinafter Economic Survey of Mex-
ico]. OECD also admits:
[T]he banking system scores poorly on some indicators. Labour productivity
is relatively low, and further policy action is needed to facilitate the collec-
tion of bad loans... new bankruptcy procedures are yet to be fully tested and
the exercise of credit guarantees still faces high legal costs, slow proceedings
and poor enforcement at local level.
Id.
62. International Monetary Fund, Mexico, Financial System Stability Assessment, Oc-
tober 200t, IMF Country Report No. 01/92, at 6.
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the private sector for small- and medium-sized enterprises and
individuals. 63
IV. MEXICO UNDER NAFTA AND MEFTA
The effects of NAFTA have been particularly interesting. NAFFA had
both positive and negative points. It has created a market with 360 mil-
lion people. At the time it was implemented it was the largest market in
the world. Of course, it has been disregarded in some areas, but it is
important to bear in mind that this is still an ongoing process. This op-
portunity was promising for Mexico, which was the weakest party in the
agreement. The Secretariat of the WTO in the World Trade Report for
2003 said that Mexico has benefited from NAFTA. On the contrary,
others say that such benefit has not been realized as advocates promised.
A. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF NAFTA
Critics have long contended that NAFTA does not benefit Mexico. It
is argued that "the United States obtained from Mexico the total opening
of its market in services, while keeping its own market closed by means of
horizontal barriers to the free circulation of service workers. '64
As a matter of fact, the United States can apply its laws extra-territori-
ally in that the treaty extended to Mexico certain US legal concepts.
Such as investments, intellectual property, competition and antitrust law,
labour law, environmental law, the traffic of drugs, illegal immigration
and even the administration of justice. The euphemism used by the U.S.
was "convergence of values. ''65
It is necessary to consider that the free circulation of services workers
is the most controversial of the modes of supply services, not only in
NAFFA but also in GATS and many others agreements. 66 At the multi-
lateral level, liberalization has been slow. NAFTrA represents an impor-
tant small step towards negotiations for the liberalization of the free
circulation of persons. With respect to the extension of legal concepts,
Mexico has greatly benefited from the trade north because the rule of law
concept has become better understood and consequently more aptly ap-
plied. Since then, important changes have been made in Mexican laws,
such as the Foreign Investments Law and the Credit Institutions Law. As
a result, the predictability and legal certainty in the judiciary has in-
creased significantly since NAFTA came into force.
63. Economic Survey of Mexico, supra note 62, at 5.
64. Durval de Noronha Goyos, MERCOSUR v FTTA, 1998 IN'VL TRADE L. & REG.
20, 21.
65. Id. at 22.
66. OECD, Service Providers on the Move-Labour Mobility and the WTO General
Agreement on Trade in Services, in POLICY BRIEF (Aug. 2003), http://
www.oecd.org; see also Gary Hufbauer & Tony Warren, The Globalization of Ser-
vices: What Has Happened? What are the implications? (Inst. for Int'l Econ., Work-
ing Paper 99-12, 1999), available at http://www.iie.com.
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Another negative effect of NAFTA could be the discrimination against
third parties that frustrate the attainment of multilateral objectives built
on non-discrimination. These third parties engender a degree of trade
diversion and the application of numerous rules of origin and differing
standards that could make international trade more complex and costly.
Furthermore, the overlapping of these agreements risks undermining the
transparency of trading rules, which are some of the fundamental princi-
ples of the WTO. 6 7
Others have commented that NAFTA, as negotiated and consequently
implemented, was one of the main reasons for the Mexican crisis.
Maysami and Williams write:
As a result of the NAFTA model, Mexico became a client state of
the US designed to buy services, industrial and agricultural products
and to produce huge trade deficits to be financed with speculative
borrowings by the financial sector. In 1994 this bizarre situation
caused the accumulation by Mexico of an enormous trade deficit of
the value of US $19 billion which in turn caused the liquidity crisis in
Mexico at the beginning of 1995 and the massive devaluation of the
peso.68
However, as previously discussed, the Mexican banking system was al-
ready in trouble several years before NAFTA came into force. In fact,
the banking system was too weak when Mexico joined NAFTA. There
were several reasons for this weakness, such as erroneous economic poli-
cies, a centralized focus by the privatized banking system on lending to
the government and state-owned companies in order to subsidize its scan-
dalous deficit, lack of proper management in the banks, lack of transpar-
ent procedures when the privatization itself was carried out, and the lack
of moral solvency and technical acumen by those in charge of the banks.
B. POSITIVE EFFECTS OF NAF]A
The Secretariat of the WTO commented in November 2003:
Participation in RTAs, particularly the NAF-TA, has exposed Mexi-
can producers to foreign competition and subjected them to strong
pressure to increase productivity. Average productivity per worker,
in the manufacturing sector, which accounted for an average 21 per
cent of total GDP during 1996 - 2000, increased at an average rate of
6.8 per cent in the period 1990 - 2001. At the same time, preferential
access to the huge North American market has granted certain Mexi-
can producers the demand base, capital, and technology necessary to
exploit economies of scale and sustain productivity gains... FDI in-
flows into Mexico, which averaged $3.9 billion from 1990 to 1993,
trebled in the period 1994 to 1999 and reached $25 billion in 2001.69
67. WTO REPORT 2003, supra note 6, at xvi.
68. See Maysami & Williams, supra note 37, at 2.
69. See WTO REPORT 2003, supra note 6, at 63.
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One of the advantages of NAFTA is that most of the sectors have been
implemented step-by-step (although this was not possible in the financial
services as has been seen). This process of implementation implies that
some sectors are considered more important than others, and after a rea-
sonable period of time those sectors will be liberalized. NAFTA's fifteen-
year phase-in sounded reasonable, as it was planned to prevent serious
disruption by allowing the markets to adapt to the changes gradually.
Between 1994 and 1998, the annual growth average of the total trade
between Mexico, the United States, and Canada has been 12 percent
above the growth in the global goods trade (9 percent). 70 In only five
years, total trading between the three nations increased 75 percent
(nearly U.S. $227 billion) to achieve U.S. $500 billion in 1998. Also, it
should be noted that in 1995 Canada became the second market for Mex-
ican products.71
Mexico has become the second most important trade partner for the
United States. 72 After five years, bilateral trade between both nations
increased by almost 120 percent, from U.S. $88.1 billion in 1993 to over
U.S. $187 billion in 1998. In the same year, Mexican exports to the
United States increased by U.S. $103 billion, an increase of 143 percent
compared to 1993. The growth rate of Mexican exports to the United
States has been superior to the average of those from the rest of the
world. Over one dollar out of each ten that the United States spends
abroad is spent on Mexican products. 73 Thus, "Mexico's exports alone
have tripled since 1994, with Mexico recently displacing Japan as the sec-
ond largest supplier of goods and services to the United States. '74 Thus,
we can think that NAFTA effectively has succeeded in stimulating trade
and investment.
Mexico has benefited greatly from NAFTA. For this reason, and be-
cause of the European Union's success in its economic integration, Presi-
dent Vicente Fox is trying to strengthen this integration. From the
beginning of his administration, President Fox proposed a plan to expand
NAFTA to a North American Common Market, as a North American
70. Among other advantages, NAFTA provides abundant opportunities for local in-
terest groups. The so-called rules of origin are designed to safeguard originating
goods with preferential treatment against non-originating goods, such as the goods
imported from other non-members countries. In other words, it limits the benefits
of the agreement to producers of the member states only. Marise Cremona, Re-
marks at the Class of Regional Economic Integration, International Economic
Law Course, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, Univer-
sity of London (Apr. 28, 2003).
71. BANCOMEXT STUDY, supra note 11, at 26. Mexican exports to Canada increased at
a rate of 12% from 1994 to 1998, reaching more than five billion dollars.
72. See Gabrielle Marceau & Cornelis Reiman, When and How Is a Regional Trade
Agreement Compatible with the WTO?, 28 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION
123 (2001).
73. See BANCOMEXT STUDY, supra note 11, at 28.
74. See Jennifer E. Harman, Mexican President Vicente Fox's Proposal for Expanding
NAFTA into a European Union-Style Common Market-Obstacles and Outlook, 7
L. & Bus. REV. AM. 207, 208, 212 (2001).
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replica of the European Union. However, such suggestion has not been
developed by the United States and Canada. 75 In general, the trade
among NAFTA parties has increased significantly. Mexico has become
Canada's largest trading partner as well as its eighth largest exporter mar-
ket, and Canada is Mexico's second largest market for sales.
76
Another important advantage for NAFTA is that, from the point of
view of coherent legal structure, it is more integrated and its enforceabil-
ity is more effective. 77 The WTO is still fragmented into three parts with
disciplines applying to goods in Part I (GATT), another applying to ser-
vices in Part II (GATS), and an agreement applying to intellectual prop-
erty rights in Part III (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, or TRIPS). In contrast, NAFIA has incorporated investments
and technical barriers to trade that apply to both trade in goods and trade
in services alike in only one body.7
8
C. THE MEXICAN-EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (MEFTA)
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NAFFA.
MEFT'A represents significant implications for NAFTA Members and
NAFTA in general. Holbein and Ranieri write: "The European Union
(EU) is the United States' largest aggregate trading partner and Mexico
is its second largest national trading partner. Any agreement that elimi-
nates trade barriers and improves market access between these two cru-
cial trading partners potentially has major implications for U.S.
business."'79 Mexico has become a bridge between the EU and the
United States and Canada and vice-versa. Therefore, enterprises coming
from commercial partners of Mexico would now be able to establish op-
erations in Mexico in order to take advantage of its preferential access to
U.S., Canadian, European, and Latin American markets.80
The EU represents an attractive opportunity for Mexico because it is
the largest and most integrated trade arrangement in the world bound
into a customs union that is committed to political and economic integra-
tion.81 It is home to more than 400 million people (now with the enlarge-
75. Id. at 208.
76. Id. at 213.
77. The RTAs generally have a more effective and sophisticated dispute-settlement
procedure. For example, see the powerful case of chapters 11 and 20 of NAFTA.
NAFTA, supra note 22, chs. 11, 20, 32 I.L.M. at 639, 693.
78. See Stephenson, supra note 5, at 193.
79. THE EU-MEXICO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT XViii (James R. Holbein & Nick W.
Ranieri eds., Transnational Publishers, 2002) [hereinafter MEFTA TRADE IN SER-
VICES AGREEMENT].
80. Id. at 23; see also Bilateral Trade Relations, European Commission Trade Doc, at 1,
available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral. Mexico's imports from
EU are engines, autos (specific arrangements for cars include a tariff cut from 20%
to 3.3% with the tariff disappearing in 2003), textiles, machinery and equipment,
construction machinery and equipment, telecommunications equipment,
medicines, and milk. In turn, Mexico exports to EU oil, auto parts, avocado, cut
flowers, fruits, juices, honey, coffee, silver, copper, and steel.
81. MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICE AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 21.
66 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 11
ment to twenty-five countries), and has a gross domestic product of over
U.S. $7 trillion, making it the world's second largest economy behind the
United States.82 Until 1975, links between Mexico and the EU were
mainly focused on historical and cultural ties. A First Framework Coop-
eration Agreement was signed in September 1975 and renewed in Octo-
ber 1980. In the late 1990s, because of structural changes, modernization
processes, and trade liberalization in Mexico (including Mexico's partici-
pation), political, economic, and commercial cooperation with the EU
improved considerably, resulting in this commercial agreement. During
1993, the EU's trade with Mexico registered an accumulated growth of
4.7 percent, and the EU became the second largest investor in Mexico.
From 1994 to 1998, accumulated Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico
was U.S. $41.2 billion, with 21 percent constituting EU investment. The
main investors were the United Kingdom (32 percent), the Netherlands
(30.5 percent) and Germany (19 percent). 83
The EU found Mexico and NAFTA extremely attractive. Among
other factors, this attraction resulted from the economic growing rate of
the NAFTA parties. A study by the Centre for Policy Studies showed
that NAFTA economies are growing at a rate twice that of the EU. Be-
tween 1992 and 2000 Mexico had a 38 percent increase in jobs while the
United States and Canada had a 13 percent increase. During the same
time period, the EU only experienced a 3 percent increase in
employment. 84
The EU and Mexico signed three legal instruments (collectively known
as MEFFA):
Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination, and Co-operation
Agreement (Global Agreement); Interim Agreement to the Global
Agreement (Trade in Goods Agreement); and Final Act of the Global
Agreement (Trade in Services Agreement). 85
With respect to comparing the MEFTA and NAFTA, it can be said that
MEFTA will stimulate trade by liberalizing almost all trade by 2007, a bit
earlier than NAFTA in some areas. Moreover, MEFTA has negotiated
tariffs lower than those that existed within NAFTA. 86 In NAFTA, mem-
ber parties "are not required to give up a portion of their sovereignty...
with the possible exception of Chapter 11 arbitration. ' 87 In turn, the EU
has supranational authorities where they share common policies.
As for services, most of the sectors were negotiated, such as telecom-
munications, energy, tourism, and financial services, although certain sub-
82. Casey Burges, An Anglo-NAFTA Union: Does it Make Sense?, 8 L. & Bus. REV.
AM. 685, 686 (2002).
83. BANCOMEXT STUDY, supra note 11, at 91; see also Bilateral Trade Relations, Euro-
pean Commission Trade Doc (July 2000), at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/
bilateral.
84. Burges, supra note 82, at 693.
85. Alberto de la Pena, Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the European
Union, 7 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 369, 371 (2001).
86. MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 23.
87. Burges, supra note 82, at 689.
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sectors, such as audio-visual, maritime sabotage, and air transport, are
explicitly excluded. It should still be considered to have "substantial
sectoral coverage" according to article five of GATS. 88
MEFTA has gone beyond the commitments of GATS (as will be seen
in the last section of this paper relating to financial services). The agree-
ment's objectives include the progressive and reciprocal liberalization of
trade in services (not exceeding ten years). For example, the financial
services sector was practically liberalized when the MEFTA Trade Ser-
vices Agreement came into force. Article 12, paragraph 4, subparagraph
(e) of the Trade in Service Section of MEFTA states the general rule:
No Party.shall maintain or adopt the following measures:...
(e) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in the terms of
maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value
of individual or aggregate foreign investment.89
The exceptions, some of which will be described in the last section of
this paper, are described in the list of reservations set out in Annex I of
the Trade in Service Agreement of MEFTA. 90 This liberalization was
consistent with the previous rule adopted by Mexico (discussed in the
third section of this paper) when Congress approved in 1999 the allowing
of foreign economic agents to own 100 percent of the capital stock of
Mexican banks.9 1
It is worth mentioning that in the services sector, the EU will clearly
benefit more than Mexico. This disparity is due to the EU's net-exporter
nature of services and financial services. European banks and insurance
companies, like their U.S. and Canadian counterparts, are authorized to
establish and operate directly on the Mexican territory. 92 In return, Mex-
ican banks will have similar access to the EU.93 However, as Mexico is
not a net-exporter in financial services, this potential market cannot be
exploited (in the short or medium term) in such a manner as the one in
industrial products and manufacturing where the Mexican competitive
advantage lies.
The future of MEFTA will depend on the future integration of the
FTAA. 94 They might interact and complement each other, converting
Mexico into the trade hub between the Americas and Europe.
88. Proposal for a Council Decision on the Community Position within the EC-Mexico
Joint Council on the Implementation of articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the Interim
Agreement, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM(2000) 9 final/4) 6 (2000) [hereinafter Com-
munication from the European Commission 2000].
89. MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 428.
90. Article 17 of the MEFTA Trade Services Agreement will permit the Members the
elimination of the remaining discriminations within three years of the entry of the
Agreement.
91. Reforms to the Foreign Investments Law and other Laws, published Jan. 19, 1999,
in the Official Diary, available at http://dof.terra.com.mx/.
92. Communication from the European Commission 2000, supra note 88, at 5.
93. MEFTA TRADE SERVICE AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 415.
94. De la Calle Pardo, supra note 3, at 379.
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V. NAFTfA, MEFTA, AND GATS AND THEIR CONNECTION
WITH THE LIBERALIZATION OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES IN MEXICO
In a very interesting study, the OECD observes that "WTO-consistent
preferential [regional] trade agreements can complement but cannot sub-
stitute for coherent multilateral rules and progressive multilateral liberal-
isation" and that "[i]n some particularly sensitive areas, regional
initiatives have been no more successful - and in some cases less successful
- than activity at the multilateral level."' 95 In the specific case of financial
services, the OECD stated that "while the GATS has achieved a higher
level of liberalisation in financial services than that found in .most RTAs,
the development of the GATS Understanding on Commitments in Finan-
cial Services took advantage of insights gained in financial market opening
at the regional level."' 96 Thus, it is legally relevant to know to what extent
each RTA could go beyond WTO Agreements. 97 Stability and liberaliza-
tion constitute two of the main objectives that bilateral, regional, and
multilateral agreements share and promote. 98 This section will assess to
what extent NAFTA and MEFTA have exceeded services trade in rela-
tion to GATS.
Stability is an important element for international trade in order to
guarantee security, credibility, and predictability. These key factors give
both investors and consumers in general the vision of market opportuni-
ties. Although GATS has contributed in many ways to this goal of credi-
bility and predictability, it is acceptable to say that:
GATS scores rather poorly... and . . . the possibility allowed for
under the GATS of including commitments in national schedules
95. United States Embassy-Tokyo, Japan, Ministers at OECD Call for New WTO
Trade Negotiating Round, available at http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-
ec0092.html (May 16, 2001); OECD, Regional Trade Agreements (2003), available
at http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,2340,en_2649_34145_31839102_I_1_1_1,00.
html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
96. Economic Survey of Mexico, supra note 63, at 7.
97. It should be noted that NAFTA, like many other RTAs, is inconsistent in some
degree with GATS, and consequently brings incompatibility and uncertainty to the
world trade system. It has been generally recognized that "the lack of clarity of
Art. V of GATS (and Art. XXIV of GATT) and the ambiguities surrounding this
provisions leave the compatibility of RTA's largely uncertain." See Sherry M. Ste-
phenson, GATS and Regional Integration, in GATS 2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 509 (Pierre Sauve & Robert M. Stern eds.,
2000). See also Luis Abuggatas et al., Liberalization of Trade in Services: Options
and Implications, in TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 91 (Diana Tussie
ed., 2003). See N.E. Scott, Compatibility of EU Regional Trade Agreements with
WTO rules in the Post Uruguay Round (1996 Int'l Trade L. & Reg.). Regarding the
compatibility between RTAs and WTO agreements it should be noted that the
case Turkey- Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R,
has been a landmark because it is the first one which gives a substantial meaning to
article XXIV and the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to make the RTA
compatible with the WTO rules (although this is related directly with GATT, the
same principles might be applied in the future for GATS).
98. See Stephenson, supra note 5, at 187 (NAFTA Agreement has become a prototype
for many developing countries to join the wave of services trade liberalization).
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that are bound at a more restrictive level than the "status quo" (or
less than actual regulatory practice) means that effectively service
providers are not necessarily provided with accurate information on
market access possibilities through this multilateral instrument.99
A good example is article XXI of GATS, which states that "A Member
(referred to in this Article as the 'modifying Member') may modify or
withdraw any commitment in its Schedule, at any time after three years
have elapsed from the date on which that commitment entered into force,
in accordance of the provisions of this Article."' ° NAFTA and MEFFA,
on the contrary, have gone notoriously beyond GATS because they pro-
vide the status quo provision 0 1 in a more predictable way for the treat-
ment of existing trade in services. With respect to the Financial Services
Chapter, article 1404 states as follows:
No Party may adopt any measure restricting any type of cross border
trade in financial services by cross border financial services of an-
other Party that the Party permits on the date of entry into force of
this Agreement, except to the extent set out in Section B of the
Party's Schedule to Annex VII.
In the same sense, Article 12 (3) of the MEFTA states: "No party may
adopt new measures for the establishment and operation of financial ser-
vices supplier of the other party, which are more discriminatory than
those applied on the date of entry into force of this Decision."10 2
Regarding liberalization, although GATS has made good efforts and
considerable positive changes in the services trade, it still falls short in the
liberalization of services markets. Stephenson argues that "most specific
commitments scheduled by both developed and developing countries are
in fact 'stand-still bindings' and do not enlarge market access for service
providers, committing the government concerned only to maintain the
current level of access." 10 3
In contrast, NAFTA and MEFTA improve such legal framework.
NAFTA includes a clause requiring that the better of either Most
Favoured Nation or National Treatment status be given to a service pro-
vider from a Member (Standard of Treatment: articles 1405 and 1406 in
the case of Chapter of Financial Services of NAFTA, and in the same
99. Id. at 191.
100. General Agreement on Trade in Services (entered into force Jan. 1995), in WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, art. XXI, at 301 (Cambridge
University Press UK, 2003).
101. This provision means actual regulatory practice, and it gives the promise to the
parties involved that they will not go back, withdraw or decrease their current
commitments or regulatory practice.
102. Joint Council Decision No. 1 Covering Trade in Services, Investments and Related
Payments, Protection in Intellectual Property Rights and Dispute Settlement;
MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 428-29.
103. See Stephenson, supra note 5, at 192 (both the limited number of sectors included
in national schedules as well as the limited number of overall commitments, partic-
ularly by developing countries, testify to the lack of success of the GATS).
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sense articles 14 and 15 of MEFTA). 10 4 Article 1205 of NAFTA, titled
Local Presence, is beneficial for all Members because it allows service
providers to determine the most efficient way to carry out their trade.
Specifically, article 1205 provides: "No Party may require a service pro-
vider of another party to establish or maintain a representative office or
any form of enterprise, or to be resident, in its territory as a condition for
the cross-border provision of a service. °105 Article 1210 paragraph 3 and
article 1111 of NAFTA set forth further requirements. 10 6 Article 1210,
titled Licensing and Certification, provides:
1. With a view to ensuring that any measure adopted or maintained
by a Party relating to the licensing or certification of nationals of
another Party does not constitute an unnecessary barrier to trade,
each Party shall endeavour to ensure that any such measure ... 3.
Each Party shall, within two years of the date of entry into force of this
Agreement, eliminate any citizenship or permanent residency require-
ment set out in its Schedule to Annex I that it maintains for the licens-
ing or certification of professional service providers of another Party.
Where a Party does not comply with this obligation with respect to a
particular sector, any other Party may, in the same sector and for
such period as the non-complying Party maintains its requirement,
have sole recourse to maintaining an equivalent requirement set out
in its Schedule to Annex I, reinstating:
(a) Any such requirement at the federal level that it eliminated pur-
suant to this Article; or
(b) On notification to the non-complying Party, any such require-
ment at the state or provincial level existing on the date of entry into
force of this Agreement.
2. The Parties shall consult periodically with a view to determining
the feasibility of removing any remaining citizenship or permanent
residency requirement for the licensing or certification of each
other's service providers. 10 7
Article 1111, titled Special Formalities and Information Requirements,
provides:
1. Nothing in Article 1102 shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting or maintaining a measure that prescribes special formalities
in connection with the establishment of investments by investors of
another Party, such as a requirement that investors be residents of the
Party or that investments be legally constituted under the laws or regu-
lations of the Party, provided that such formalities do not materially
104. Id. at 198. See also MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at
428, 429; NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1405, 32 I.L.M. at 657, stating as follows:
Eaqh party shall accord to Investors of another party treatment no less fa-
vourable than that it accords to its own investors, in like circumstances, with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation and sale or other disposition of financial institution and investment
in financial institution in its territory.
105. NAFTA, supra note 22, 32 I.L.M. at 289.
106. Stephenson, supra note 5, at 198.
107. See NAFFA, supra note 22, 32 I.L.M. at 289.
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impair the protections afforded by a Party to investors of another
Party and investments of investors of another Party pursuant to this
Chapter.10 8
A. COMPARING FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITMENTS UNDER
NAFTA, MEFTA, AND THE SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC
COMMITMENTS OF MEXICO (ANNEXED TO ITS
SCHEDULE TO THE GATS) 10 9
First, it should be stated that the main objectives of NAFTA are to
reduce or completely eliminate economic barriers and promote economic
integration among the NAFTA Members, to promote the development of
a key legal framework needed to improve security for investments, and to
facilitate the free flow of goods and services. 110 Chapter fourteen was a
central priority of the U.S. and Canadian negotiators.1 1 1 However, from
the Mexican point of view, this chapter has been a sensitive area. For the
first time in fifty years, Mexico will permit financial institutions from
other NAFTIA countries to establish and wholly own Mexican subsidiaries
to provide banking, insurance, and securities services. It should be noted
that NAFFA establishes a transition phase for each financial service sec-
tor to the year 2000.112
NAFTA establishes two basic principles guiding the investment in the
financial service sector:
1. Commercial presence and cross Border Services: Financial Ser-
vices providers of a NAFTA country may establish banking, insur-
ance and securities operations, as well other types of financial
services in any other NAFTA Country. Each country may determine
the juridical form in which those services provided in its own country
may take. Each country must permit its residents to purchase finan-
cial services in the territory of another NAFTA country, although the
country does not have to allow solicitation activities by such provid-
ers in its own territory. Also, a country may not impose new restric-
tions on the cross-border provision of financial services in a sector.
108. Id.
109. Schedules of Commitments and Lists of Article II Exemptions, Feb. 26 1998,
WORLD TRADE GATS/SC/56Suppl.3, available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
tratop-e/serv-e/servcommitments-e.htm, at 3 [hereinafter Schedule of
Commitments].
110. See NAFTA, supra note 22, chs. 1 & 2, 32 I.L.M. at 297-98; see also HASTINGS,
supra note 22.
111. It is worth mentioning that the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
(CUSFTA) was the first trade agreement ever to include provisions on financial
services, as both countries have been net-exporters of financial services. This ex-
plains as well why the United States and Canada were putting pressure on Mexico
in opening its market in financial services. ERIC MILLER, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN
THE TRADING SYSTEM: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTUS 2 (IADB, Occasional Paper
No. 4, 1999), available at http://www.iadb.org.
112. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS; CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 868 (4th ed. 2002); see also NAFTA,
supra note 22, ch. 14, 32 I.L.M. at 657.
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2. Non-Discriminatory Treatment: each NAFTA country will provide
both national treatment and most favoured nation treatment to other
NAFTA financial services providers operating in its territory. This
means treatment no less favourable than that accorded by a party to
its own investors, financial services providers, and financial institu-
tions in like circumstances. A NAFTA country may satisfy the re-
quirement of national treatment even though it may treat financial
services providers of another party differently from domestic finan-
cial services if it accords equal competitive opportunities. 13
The guiding principle of NAFFA regarding financial supervision is re-
served to the host country. However, "regulators are permitted to nego-
tiate bilateral agreements leading to regulatory and supervisory
harmonization."' 1 4
On the other hand, Mexico signed the WTO/GATS. Mexico's commit-
ments are annexed to its Schedule to GATS. Specific commitments are
made according to the four modes of supply for each services sector: (1)
cross border supply; (2) consumption abroad; (3) commercial presence;
and (4) free movement of natural persons.' 15 Mexico's commitments set
up some deviations from the non-discrimination and national treatment
principles. For example, foreign institutions must obtain authorization
from the Ministry of Finance. Additionally, foreign institutions should
remain under effective control of Mexican holders. Finally, foreign in-
vestment by governments is not permitted.
Mexico has accepted a higher degree of liberalization of cross-border
trade in Financial Services with NAFTA and MEFTA Members rather
than with GATS Members. 1 6 The following chart will help illustrate this
point.
113. See NAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 14, Arts 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406.
114. Financial Integration IADB Doc, supra note 26, at 105 (2002), available at http://
www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubb-2002e_7384.pdf.
115. Schedule of Commitments, supra note 109, at 3.
116. It is worth mentioning that in the Financial Services Agreement of GATS (1997)
most of the Latin American countries did not make commitments in the banking
and insurance sector in the mode 1, 2 and 4. This is because such Governments
still wanted to have strict control over cross-border flows capital and regulatory
controls. See Sherry M. Stephenson, Multilateral and Regional Services Liberaliza-
tion by Latin America and the Caribbean. OAS Trade Unit/Ser.D/XXII SG/TU/
TUS-9, 1st ed. March 2001, at 10.
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NAFTA 1 17 MEFTA GATS
Commercial Banks (Institu-
ciones de Banca Multiple)
and Holding Companies
(Sociedades Controladoras)




share limit in banking from
8 percent to 15 percent.
During the transition phase
(1994-2000), no foreign
bank can have more than 1
1/2 percent market share,
nor a foreign securities
dealer more than 4 percent.
Aggregate foreign invest-
ment up to 30 per cent of
common stock capital, Ini-
tial limits on foreign Invest-
ment in foreign financial
affiliates but none after 1st
January 2000:
"Aggregate foreign invest-
ments in holding companies
and in commercial banks
are limited to 30 percent of
common stock capital
("capital ordinario"). These
percentage limits do not
apply to investments in for-
eign financial affiliates as
such term is defined in, and
subject to terms and condi-
tions under, Sections B and
C of this Schedule" (In
other words, these limits
shall be removed at the end
of the transition period:
After 1st January 2000).118
The general rule is
described in the
Article 12 paragraph 4 sub-
paragraph (e) of the Trade




"No Party Shall maintain or
adopt the following
measures:
(e) limitations on the par-
ticipation of foreign capital
in the terms of maximum
percentage limit on foreign
shareholding or the total




described in the list of res-
ervations set out in Annex
I of the Trade in Service




This activity is restricted to
established commercial
banks. Foreign investment
by persons exercising gov-
ernmental functions is not
allowed.
In accordance with the
applicable financial legisla-
tion, representative offices
of banking institutions are
excluded from this activity
Commercial Banks
Foreign Investors may hold
up to 40 percent of com-
mon stock capital, Limit on
individual holding is a per-
centage of capital stock or
up to twenty percent with
authorization from the Min-
istry of finance (SHCP),
Effective Control by Mexi-
cans must be required:
"This activity is restricted
to multiple banking institu-
tions. Foreign investors may
hold up to 40 per cent of
common stock capital and
up to 100 per cent of the
additional capital represent-
ing 40 per cent of non-vot-
ing common stock capital.
Foreign investment by arti-
ficial persons exercising
governmental functions is
not allowed. The limit on
individual holdings is 5 per
cent of capital stock or up
to 20 percent of capital
stock with authorization
from the SHCP. Effective
control of the enterprise by




117. NAFTA, supra note 22, Annex VII, Schedule of Mexico § A, 32 I.L.M. at 770.
118. Id. Schefer points out as well that the legal text states clearly, "Se requiere que el
control efectivo de la empresa lo mantega los inversionistas mexicanos"- "that is,
effective control of investment must remain with Mexican investors." In addition,
no individual may hold more than 5% of the capital stock of a commercial bank
without special permission from the Secretary of Finance. See SCHEFER, supra
note 23, at 116.
119. NAFTA, supra note 22, Annex VII, Schedule of Mexico § B(16), 32 I.L.M. at 774.
120. MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 428.
121. Id. at 455. It is important to mention that such Reservations shall be reviewed by
the Special Committee on Financial Services established under art. 23, with the
view to propose to the Joint Council their modification, suspension and elimina-
tion (art. 17(2) of MEFTA) and no later than three years following the entry into
force of the Agreement, the Joint Council shall adopt a decision providing for the
elimination of substantially all remaining discrimination. That decision shall con-
tain a list of commitments establishing the level of liberalization, which the Parties
agree to grant each other (art. 17(3) of MEFTA). Id. at 429.
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Cross Border purchases of
financial services in Mexi-
can pesos not allowed: "In
order to avoid impairment




of another Part shall not be
permitted to provide finan-
cial services into the terri-
tory of Mexico... and
residents of Mexico may
not purchase financial ser-
vices from cross-border
financial service providers






U.S. and Canadian insur-
ance firms can own 100 per-
cent of Mexican Insurance
companies by the year 2000:
however, making the invest-
ment through a joint venture
with a Mexican insurer will




Investments (FDI) in insur-
ance companies must be less
than 50 percent of paid-in
capital ("capital pagado")
(or limited to 49 per cent) in
Mexican firms and no limits




General rule: see Commer-
cial Bank section above.
Reservation:
Established insurance com-
panies may carry out insur-
ance and insurance-related
services. Foreign investors
may hold up to 49 percent
of the paid up capital. For-
eign investments by govern-
ments and official agencies
are not allowed. Effective
control of the enterprise by
the Mexican shareholders is
required. This percentage
limit does not apply to
investments in foreign
financial affiliates as such
item is defined in, and sub-
ject to terms and conditions





up to 40 percent; limit on
individual holdings up to 20
percent with authorization.
Effective controls must be
by Mexicans:
"Foreign investors may hold
up to 40 per cent of the
paid-up capital and up to
30 per cent of non-voting
paid-up capital. Foreign
investment by governments
and official agencies is not
allowed. The limit on indi-
vidual holdings by foreign
investors is 10 per cent of
paid-up capital or up to 20
per cent of paid-up capital
with authorisation from the
Ministry of Finance and
Public Credit (SHCP).
Effective control of the





122. Schedule of Commitments, supra note 109, at 3.
123. NAFTA, supra note 22, Annex VII, Schedule of Mexico § B(8), 32 I.L.M. at 774.
124. MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 454.
125. Schedule of Commitments, supra note 109, at 1.
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Securities Firms (Casas de
Bolsa) Securities Specialists
(Especialistas Bursatiles)
Aggregate FDI are limited
to 30 percent of capital in
Mexican Securities Firms
Initial limits on FDI until
1999
No Limits on FDI for for-
eign firms and Individual
holdings:
During the transition phase
(1994-2000) The limit for
securities activities by for-
eigners will increase from
10 percent to 20 percent.
"Aggregated FDI in securi-
ties firms and securities spe-
cialist are limited to 30
percent of capital ("capital
social") and individual for-
eign investment are limited
to 10 percent of capital,
while individual investments
by Mexicans may, with
approval from the
Secretaria de Hacienda y
Credito Publico (Ministry of
Finance), rise to 15 percent
of capital. These percentage
limits do not apply to
investments in foreign
financial affiliates as such
term is defined in and sub-
ject to terms and conditions
B and C of this Sched-
ule" 12 6 (In other words,
these limits shall be
removed at the end of the
transition period: After 1st
January 2000).
General rule: see Commer-




specialists may carry (estab-
lishment and cross border).
Foreign investment by per-
sons exercising governmen-
tal function is not allowed.
126. NAFTA, supra note 22, Annex VII, Schedule of Mexico, 32 I.L.M. at 770.
Securities firms and securi-
ties specialists may carry
this activity and FDI may
hold up to 40 percent, limit
on individual holding up to
20 percent and the Effec-
tive control of the enter-
prise by the Mexican
shareholders is required:
"Securities firms and securi-
ties specialists may carry
out this activity. Foreign
investors may hold up to 40
per cent of the common
stock capital and up to 100
per cent of the additional
capital representing 40 per
cent of the non-voting com-
mon stock capital. Foreign
investment by artificial per-
sons exercising governmen-
tal functions is not allowed.
The limit on individual
holdings is 10 per cent of
the capital stock or up to
20 per cent of the capital
stock with authorization
from the SHCP. Effective
control of the enterprise by
the Mexican shareholders is
required."
Mode 1 Unbound












Aggregate FDI are limited
to 49%, No limits on DFI
for foreign firms and indi-
vidual holdings:
"Aggregate foreign invest-
ments in general deposit
warehouses, financial leas-
ing companies, financial fac-
toring companies and
bonding companies must be
less than 50 percent of
paid-in capital ("capital
pagado"). These percentage
limits do not apply to
investments in foreifn
financial affiliates." I27 In
other words, these limits
shall be removed at the end
of the transition period:
After tst January 2000.
General rule: see Commer-






may hold up to 49 per cent
of the paid-up capital. For-
eign investments by persons
exercising governmental
functions are not allowed.
Effective control of the
enterprise by the Mexican
shareholders is required.
This percentage limit does
not apply to "investments
in foreign financial affili-
ates" as such term is
defined in the Affiliates
Section.
Financial Leasing
General rule: see Commer-




cial Leasing companies may
carry out financial leasing
activities.
Foreign investors may hold




functions are not allowed.
Effective control of the
enterprise... This percent-
age limit does not apply to
"investments in foreign
financial affiliates" as such
term is defined in Affiliates
Section.
Financial Factoring




up to 49 per cent of paid
up capital, limit on individ-
ual holdings of 10 per cent
of paid up capital and
Effective controls for Mexi-
cans is required.
"Financial leasing compa-
nies may carry out financial
leasing activities. Foreign
investors may hold up to 49
per cent of paid-up capital
and up to 30 per cent of
non-voting paid-up capital.
Foreign investment by arti-
ficial persons exercising
governmental functions is
not allowed. The limit on
individual holdings is 10 per
cent of paid-up capital.
Effective control of the







up to 49 percent of paid up
capital, limit on individual
holdings of 10 percent of
paid up capital and Effec-
tive controls for Mexicans is
required.
"Foreign investors may hold
up to 49 per cent of the
paid-up capital and up to
30 per cent of the non-vot-
ing paid-up capital. Foreign
investment by artificial per-
sons exercising governmen-
tal functions is not allowed.
The limit on individual
holdings is 10 per cent of
the paid-up capital. Effec-
tive control of the enter-
prise by the Mexican
shareholders is required."
127. Id. However, it should be mentioned that Mexico has set out in Annex VII of
NAFTA some ambiguous reservations regarding the establishment of commercial
banks, where the Mexican Authorities could use enormous discretion, conse-
quently affecting the freedom of establishment to other NAFTA Parties.
128. Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 109.
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exchange firms are not
allowed. This limitation
does not apply to invest-
ments in foreign financial
affiliates as such term is
defined in and subject to
terms. ..,129
Source: Stephenson, (Col-
umns of NAFTA and
GATS) 13 1
General rule: see Commer-




banks and established for-
eign exchange firms may
carry out this activity.
(Establishment and cross
border) Foreign investors
may hold up to 49 percent
of the paid-up capital. For-
eign investments by persons
exercising governmental
functions are not allowed.
Effective control of the
enterprise by the Mexican
shareholders is required.
This percentage limit does
not apply to "investments
in foreign financial affili-
ates" as such term is
defined in Affiliates
Section.
Source: Annex I of the




FDI may hold up to forty-9
percent of the paid-up capi-
tal, limit on individual hold-
ing is 10 percent of the paid
up capital and Effective
Control of the enterprise by
the Mexican Shareholders is
required:
"Foreign exchange firms
may also carry out this
activity. Foreign investors
may hold up to 49 per cent
of the paid-up capital and
up to 30 per cent of the
non-voting paid-up capital.
Foreign investment by arti-
ficial persons exercising
functions of authority is not
allowed. The limit on indi-
vidual holdings is 10 per
cent of the paid-up capital.
Effective control of the




VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Mexico has achieved its position as a trade hub in the international and
regional trade system. It is the only member of NAFTA to secure a free
trade agreement with the EU. This privileged position makes Mexico a
platform for utilizing tariff reductions for goods and service providers,
thereby seeking to expand its market in services to both Europe and
North America.
The process of modernizing Mexico started in the 1980s with President
Miguel De La Madrid when the government announced that the country
was joining the GATT, and continued when it joined the Mexico-U.S.
Commercial Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment in Novem-
ber 1987 (predecessor to NAFTA). During the late 1980s, Mexico started
to modify its commercial, civil, and property laws.
The liberalization of financial services in Mexico has occurred primarily
in the last ten years. The total assets of foreign banks rose remarkably
from 5 to 80 percent. Regulation of entry into the financial market of
financial services has changed, diminishing entry barriers significantly.
This liberalization has been achieved through three different steps. The
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Stephenson, supra note 5, at 200, see also NAFTA, supra note 22, Annex VII,
Schedule of Mexico; Schedule of Commitments, supra note 109, at 1.
132. MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 79.
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first occurred when NAF1'A came into force, and the second occurred
when the Mexican Congress approved legislative reforms in the financial
sector in February 1995. The transitional implementation once projected
by NAFTA changed when the financial system collapsed in the end of
1994. The third step occurred in 1999 when Congress approved a provi-
sion allowing foreign economic agents to own 100 percent of the capital
stock of Mexican banks. Since then, foreign institutions have been merg-
ing with and buying domestic banks. These include Citibank, HSBC, and
Banco Bilbao Viscaya. Although it could be argued that the Mexican
financial system is now controlled by foreign investors, it should be said
as well that it has achieved the main benefits of trade liberalization in
financial services: namely, more competition, efficiency, and productivity,
and better financial intermediation. However, there are still some points
that need to be improved, such as the collection of bad loans and the low
level of credit to the private sector for individuals and small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises.
Regarding NAFTA, Mexico's exports and trade have tripled since
1994, with Mexico replacing Japan as the second largest supplier of goods
and services to the United States. Thus, NAFTA has succeeded in stimu-
lating trade and investment for Mexico. However, in the services sector,
the United States, Canada, and the EU (with MEFTA) will clearly bene-
fit more than Mexico. This is due to their net-exporter nature of services,
specifically in regard to financial services. European banks and insurance
companies are authorized to establish and operate directly on Mexican
territory like their U.S. and Canadian counterparts. Because Mexico is
not a net-exporter in financial services, this potential market will not be
able to be exploited (in the short or medium term) like the market in
industrial products and manufacturing.
Although there is a lack of clarity with respect to how far or to what
extent RTAs have to exceed GATS, it should be stated that with respect
to the liberalization of financial services, NAFTA and MEFTA have gen-
erally gone beyond the multilateral rules in services (as has been shown
in the table in the preceding section of this paper). NAFTA and MEFTA
have gone beyond GATS in this sector because they are economic inte-
gration agreements which meet the relevant tests of GATS article V.
Those tests include: (1) covering of substantially all sub-sectors (no mode
of supply is a priori excluded from coverage); (2) providing for absence or
elimination of any discrimination between or among the parties in the
covered sub-sectors, through gradual elimination of existing discrimina-
tory measures (for example, three years in financial services in accor-
dance to article 17 of MEFTA Trade Agreement in Service) or providing
new or more discriminatory measures at the entry into force of the agree-
ment or within a reasonable time frame (although, as a result of the legis-
lative reforms on financial services in 1999, many sub sectors were
already open); and (3) not raising (nor lead to the raising of) the overall
level of barriers to the trade in services on non-parties Members of the
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WTO in the covered sectors and sub sectors. Moreover, equality of treat-
ment of the services suppliers of other WTO Members established within
the territory of any of the parties to the Agreements will not be affected
(according to articles V:4 and V:6 of the GATS) .
In NAFTA and MEFTA, the percentage of foreign participation in fi-
nancial services is notoriously higher than GATS, and the effective con-
trol of investment enterprises is not required to be by Mexicans
shareholders, as in GATS. 133 Furthermore, in NAFTA and MEFTA, Na-
tional Treatment and Most Favoured Nation are unconditional principles,
whereas in GATS, National Treatment is not a general obligation, but
rather the result of specific commitments subject to numerous exceptions.
A similarity between the three agreements is that all contain a "pru-
dential carve out" to ensure that the liberalization does not risk supervi-
sion and prudential regulation. Also, in NAFTA and MEFTA, the
services liberalization has been easier to achieve because there are a lim-
ited number of participants with similar objectives. However, it is worth
mentioning that neither GATS, MEFTA, nor NAFTA guarantee cross-
border trade for financial services, 134 as Paragraph 13 of Annex VII of
NAFTA clearly shows, 135 where there are ambiguous reservations re-
garding the establishment of commercial banks. Consequently, Mexican
authorities could use enormous discretion, affecting the freedom of estab-
lishment to other NAFTA parties. 136
133. Stephenson, supra note 5, at 199.
134. Id.
135. Paragraph 13 of Section B of Annex VII: Reservations, Specific Commitments and
Other Items, states:
Following the transition period, acquisition of a commercial bank established
in Mexico, or of the assets or liabilities thereof, by an investor of another
Party will only be authorised by Mexico, subject to reasonable prudential con-
siderations on a case-by-case basis, if the sum of the capital of the acquired
commercial bank and the capital of any foreign commercial bank affiliate
already controlled by the adquiror would exceed four percent of the aggre-
gate capital of all commercial banks in Mexico."
NAFTA, supra note 22, Annex VII, Schedule of Mexico § B(13), 32 I.L.M. at 774 (empha-
sis added).
136. The Ministry of Finance has the power to plan, co-ordinate, evaluate and supervise
the country's banking system. It's a fact that "discretional power constitutes an
exceptional situation to the principle of law by which the administrative authority
applies or does not apply the general rule established in a legal provision." In the
case of Mexico when the Authority grants the concession of a bank or any financial
service provider it is based in its discretional power. See G. Reyes, Rules and Dis-
cretionary Power in Relation to Troubled Banks: Case Studies: Mexico, in THE RE-
FORM OF LATIN AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEMS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 153 (Ernesto Aguirre and Joseph Norton eds., 2000).
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